March 2018

 by John Sims

Follow the Money: Sources of Terrorism Funding


© CNN Money[1]

In 2015, ISIL’s annual revenue was estimated to range from $1 billion to $2.4 Billion.[2] The terror organization had a higher GDP than 60 legitimate countries. Unsurprisingly, ISIL is considered the most well-funded terrorist organization in the world.[3] Governments and law enforcement agencies must aggressively follow the money and stop the flow of financial support to reduce and ultimately eliminate terrorist conduct.

Although political and religious ideologies are often foremost in our analyses, money is primary to any terrorist attack, be it a small-scale, stand-alone attack or a large, complex operation. Terrorism operations are not always cheap. The price of an attack can range from $500, in the case of the Boston Marathon bombings, to $450,000, al Qaeda’s estimated costs for perpetrating 9/11.[4]

Terror groups leverage a catalog of methods to acquire funding. In many senses, ISIL is not doing anything new. Rather, it has succeeded in acquiring funding on a heretofore unprecedented scale for a terror organization. It continues to use traditional terrorist methods in addition to developing its own, unique means to acquire funding.

Terrorist groups exploit natural and economic resources. They operate in the vacuum created by weak and collapsed states. ISIL levied punishing taxes in territory it usurped. Terror groups are also perfectly situated to capitalize on unguarded reserves of diamonds and oil. Diamonds, in particular, are uniquely valuable and easy to smuggle. Al Qaeda reportedly traded in diamonds prior to 9/11.[5]

Oil, as is frequently the case, is the big-ticket item. Oil is the one resource that the current globalized economy cannot live without. The Middle East is rich in this precious fuel including ISIL territory in Syria and Iraq. Regardless of their lack of access to global oil markets, ISIL continues to find buyers for their black gold. ISIL allegedly made more than half of its 2015 revenue, roughly $500 million, through the sale of oil in its territory.[6]

Tried-and-true criminal operations remain at terrorists’ disposal. A mainstay of terrorist funding comes from the drug trade. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) relied on narcotics trafficking, the Colombian FARC exploited the cocaine trade, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) sought to drive out competing drug networks.[7] Ideologically, terrorists might denounce drug use as un-Islamic, but they never fail to exploit this revenue stream.

Kidnappings and ransoms remain a lucrative source of terrorism funding. Unlike the United States, Israel, and several European nations who refuse to pay ransoms, others have submitted to kidnapper’s demands. ISIL is estimated to have made between $20 to $45 million in kidnapping ransoms.[8] Kidnappings remain a mainstay of terrorist networks across the world.

Illegal second-hand markets exist as alternative avenues for illicit revenue. The Provisional Irish Republican Army engaged in arms smuggling throughout its terror reign. Hezbollah even exploited regional price differences in the United States to buy cigarettes in lower taxed states and illegally sell them at a discount in high tax states like New York. ISIL’s variation on the theme sees them plundering historical sites and selling priceless artifacts for millions of dollars.

State and non-state actors alike can provide economic support to terror networks. Before 9/11, state-sponsored terrorism was a significant concern. Libya, Iran, and Pakistan are perennially accused of funneling money to terrorist groups. Regional support is another key asset. Charities and corporations can serve as fronts to give an organization’s fiscal acquisitions a legal veneer[9]. Al Qaeda does this routinely. Since 9/11, though such criminal conduct has worsened, international condemnation and penalties have moved some state actors to chasten their public relations with terror groups.

Governments and law enforcement alike are familiar with terror organizations’ funding methods. However, shutting down the revenue flow is no simple task. Counter-terrorism forces do not have an easy time targeting natural resources such as captured oil fields without damaging assets that are invaluable to the state. Furthermore, how many generations of law enforcement have sought in vain to eliminate smuggling and drug trafficking? The needle hasn’t moved enough towards a cessation.

Terrorists will innovate. They will use any means available to acquire funding. Law enforcement must be equally innovative, vigilant and nimble when it comes to eliminating these networks as they appear. Law enforcement coordination has improved since 9/11, but a lack of interagency synergy continues to impede our ability to sufficiently reduce terror funding streams. Synergy requires cooperation between all agencies monitoring illicit revenue flows, be they drug enforcement, intelligence groups, or government trade organizations.

The formidable nature of the challenge before us can be discouraging. But our commitment to shutting down illicit terrorist funding is requisite in this fight. If law enforcement could slow or prevent even one attack, the effort would have been worth it. Governments, in coordination with financial institutions, must implement tighter regulations to monitor illicit capital flows and aggressively continue to shut down lucrative criminal activities.

Sources:

[1] Pagliery, Jose. “Inside the $2 Billion ISIS War Machine.” CNNMoney, last modified -12-06T03:04:34, accessed Mar 21, 2018, http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/06/news/isis-funding/index.html.
[2] Daniel L. Glaser, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, June 9, 2016b; Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, ISIS Financing 2015, Paris, May 2016.
[3] Nicholas Ryder (2018) Out with the Old and In with the Old? A Critical Review of the Financial War on Terrorism on the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41:2, 79-95, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1249780
[4] Nicholas Ryder, Out with the Old and In with the Old? A Critical Review of the Financial War on Terrorism on the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, 80-81.
[5] Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms: United States. General Accounting Office,2003.
[6] Maruyama, Ellie and Hallahan, Kelsey, “Following the Money: A Primer on Terrorist Financing,” Center for a New American Security, last modified June 9, accessed Mar 16, 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/following-the-money-1.
[7] Clarke, Colin P., “Drugs & Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking.” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 3
(2016): 1-15. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1536
[8] Clarke, Colin P., Kimberly Jackson, Patrick B. Johnston, Eric Robinson, and Howard J. Shatz. Financial Futures of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: Findings from a RAND Corporation Workshop. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF361.html. Also available in print form.
[9] Michael Jacobson (2010) Terrorist Financing and the Internet, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:4, 353-363, DOI: 10.1080/10576101003587184

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 by Austin Ludolph

How Exactly Are Acts of Violence Defined?


© LA Times-FBI Agents in Austin, Texas worked from one blast to another to capture serial bombing suspect Mark Anthony Conditt

Last week our attention turned to Austin, Texas as it suffered a series of bombings. Authorities have been hesitant to define bomber Mark Anthony Conditt or his deeds. You can bet questions regarding his intent are foremost among those investigators are trying to answer. Was this terrorism? Hate-crimes? Or was Conditt just a, “…very challenged young man,” as Austin police-chief Brian Manley said? [1]

Many would see bombings like his as acts of terror and they would identify Conditt as a terrorist. Law enforcement has been reluctant to use these words. Let’s make this simple as can be: Merriam-Webster defines terrorism as, “…the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.” [2] A terrorist, unsurprisingly, is, “…an advocate or practitioner of terrorism as a means of coercion.” These definitions are tautologies, but they are as straight-forward as they come. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism with a bit more nuance, “…the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” [2]

My Rise-to-Peace colleague, John Sims, aptly pointed out in the wake of the Parkland shooting that the FBI sees terrorism, first, in one of two categories: domestic or international. Next, what’s noteworthy is that terrorism, “…is not a standalone criminal charge,” but one used to determine how government resources and personnel will be allocated. [2]

Key political staff, such as White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, have avoided calling Conditt a terrorist. Secretary Sanders tweeted there was, “…no apparent nexus to terrorism at this time.” [3] Greg Abbott, the governor of Texas (R), similarly refrained from referring to Conditt as a terrorist and said, “The definition of a terrorist is tied to the mindset of the person who committed the crime.” [3]

Are the definitions themselves, or the bureaucratic actions such words trigger, the reasons we haven’t deemed Conditt a terrorist? Were the events done as a means of coercion and in furtherance of political or social objectives? The investigation remains in its infancy so it’s too soon to tell whether Conditt was or was not politically motivated. Authorities were quite transparent about locating a 25-minute video on Conditt’s cell-phone of Conditt himself explaining how he made his bombs. Was there more to the video? Austin police-chief, Manley said, “We are never going to be able to put a rationale behind these acts.” [4] At this early stage, why does he seem so sure?

© Getty Images- Serial-bomber Mark Anthony Conditt, 23, left two dead and four injured after a series of attacks in Austin, Texas

There will be those who see Conditt as a terrorist until they are shown otherwise. My Rise-to-Peace colleague, Maya Norman, pointed out, semantics matter: How we define politically-charged terms and why matters. As permutations of violence in our midst seemingly undergo a weekly mitosis, we must be fair about how we’re defining each act and why.

Sources

  1. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/us/terrorism-definition-trnd/index.html
  2. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorist
  3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/03/22/austin-bomber-challenged-young-man-or-terrorist/?utm_term=.8d2a8f412f53
  4. https://nypost.com/2018/03/21/austin-bombing-suspect-left-25-minute-video-confession-cops/
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 by Maya Norman

How Overfishing Led to Piracy


Source: www.voanews.com

In Canadian journalist Jay Bahadur’s film, The Pirates of Somalia, Bahadur travels to Puntland, embedding himself in a world known to few Western journalists. Oscar contenders have little to fear from Bahadur’s release, but The Pirates of Somalia does something remarkable: it gives us a naturalistic impression of Somalis as friendly and welcoming people and it shines a light on the rationale some give for turning to piracy.

It goes without saying that violent solutions to grievances should never be condoned, but contextualizing the behavior of Somalis who turn to attacking ships and taking hostages does prove enlightening.  For instance, it was 1991 when Somalia last had a functioning government. The country has staggered on as a lawless, failed state for the last 26 years. One consequence is that the waters off its coast have been treated like an international cornucopia, with, “…fishing fleets from around the world illegally plundering Somali stocks and freezing out the country’s own  rudimentarily-equipped fishermen.”

This report asserts that more than $300 million worth of seafood is stolen from Somalia’s unprotected coast by illegal trawlers every year. Not only are the waters overfished, but Somali fishermen don’t have the resources to compete with technologically advanced, large-scale fishing vessels. What’s striking is that while some reports say pirates are often former fishermen, many actually are not. In fact, some are simply poor people capitalizing on the misfortune of their anarchic and economically hemorrhaging state. While honest, hard-working people may be easier to forgive for turning to profitable, but illegal activities, both they and their non-fishermen compatriots reveal two iterations of one problem: Somalia can’t protect itself or an industry its people need to survive.

A NATO-led effort has reduced piracy in recent years, however, problems remain. Could the very thing that led to piracy also be its solution? According to PBS, “Access to domestic and international markets could change lives. But to sell fish internationally, Somali fishermen will have to raise their standards.” The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization is taking a stab at a solution by building a fish processing plant, though it is not operational yet. Changes are required to allow fish to sell in out-of-state markets, but such changes are achievable in the near future.

The Pirates of Somalia could have brought us deeper into the history of Somalia and the intricacies of the lawless coastal waters that resulted in overfished seas. But it succeeds in showing us that not all Somali pirates are what many think – violent, greedy men hoping to grab treasure for their chest. A deeper look into this enduring problem shows the solution, like that of many dilemmas, lies in addressing its root cause. Too often we get so bogged down in debating the nuances of a volatile issue that prescribing a solution takes many, unnecessary years. The solution to the piracy predicament in Somalia could really be something quite straight-forward: fish.

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 by Rise to Peace

Legal Difficulties May Loom: Arms Sales Between The West and its Gulf Allies

According to John Irish and Emmanuel Jarry at Reuters, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E., “…are leading a coalition fighting the Iran-aligned Houthi group that controls most of northern Yemen and the capital Sanaa.” According to human rights groups’ legal counsel, “France faces heightened legal risks for supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. despite warnings such arms could be used in the war in Yemen,” (Irish). France’s arms sales to its two Gulf allies have been criticized for being used by the pair to take civilian lives, interfere with peace prospects and generally fuel the conflict in Yemen. France’s weapon sales to the two Gulf states could bring legal headaches in the months to come.

The conflict in Yemen between the Houthis and the international Saudi-led coalition has killed 10,000 people as of March 19th, 2018. Three million others are displaced. The conflict has shown few signs of de-escalation. More death, destruction, and displacement are expected unless the international community, the militias, and the countries engaged in the conflict agree to a ceasefire and peace-seeking dialogue. Unlikely. Each actor is committed to emerging victorious. Clearly, for the war to end, someone will have to lose or unlikely but significant concessions will be necessary from all.


https://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Images/2017/6/22/6c2a986ceadd4321b5d7d274954426de_6.png

Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. see France as one of their most reliable sources for arms in the world. Each state purchases tanks, armored vehicles, munitions, and artillery. The U.A.E. alone purchases fighter-jets from France. The United States and France have continued selling arms to the Saudi-led coalition, while other participants have reduced their weapon sales fearing their use in the conflict. France and the United States agree that Iran and its proxy rebels are threats to stability and peace in Yemen. Therefore, it is unlikely they will roll back their coalition arms sales.

According to Amnesty International, “France’s arms transfers are contrary to its international commitments. The French government has authorized exports of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. in circumstances where these weapons can be used in the conflict in Yemen and could be used to carry out war crimes,” (Irish).

France would be wise to avoid seeming out of step with its stated commitment to human rights. It should adopt measures to more closely monitor the weapons it exports. Thusly, it can avoid selling to parties who use weapons on civilians as a matter of course. In turn, France’s beneficiaries in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh should be allowed to purchase on the condition that they candidly report how the weapons are being used to U.N.S.C.A.R. (the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation).

France’s foreign ministry described government’s processes as, “…robust and transparent,” in response to questions about France’s licensing system for exports. To be clear, France does have a proven track record of supporting and cooperating in efforts to strengthen peace and security in Africa for years. This will most likely continue to be the case. In light thereof, a priority should be made of ensuring its weapons are not used in the service of violating international law.


http://i.hurimg.com/i/hdn/75/0x0/5a0563dad3806c138880878e.jpg

Privately, French officials have divulged that France has already told weapon suppliers to exempt themselves from pursuing new Saudi and U.A.E export licenses. This is, at a minimum, a symbolic attempt to reduce its weapons transfers to Gulf states. “I don’t think you’ll see a clear pushback from us,” one French diplomat told Reuters, “What’s more likely is an informal message to companies to not bother asking for licenses. It will be a de-facto restriction but without saying it publicly, so as not to annoy the Saudis,” (Jarry).

The probability that the Saudi-led coalition will use French weapons in operations that could take the lives of innocent Yemeni civilians is high. France should make clear to its Gulf allies that such eventualities are intolerable. As stated, it has taken steps but it must be explicit about protocol so missteps aren’t made during the anarchy and, so-called, fog of war.


http://media.beam.usnews.com/30/47/f08176344c37bca6e5de22ab0eb6/150326-yemen-editorial.jpg

The Yemen war has already cost too many lives. France and the United States have stated their commitment to returning Yemen to its people. The two western powers should commit themselves to pursuing a roadmap to reconstruction. They mustn’t leave the African nation in the tragic tatters that it finds itself in today.

Works Cited

Irish, John, and Emmanuel Jarry. “France Faces Legal Risks over Saudi, UAE Arms Sales: Lawyers.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 19 Mar. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-france/france-faces-legal-risks-over-saudi-uae-arms-sales-lawyers-idUSKBN1GV2ME.

“UNSCAR: UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation – UNODA.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/unscar/.

Aohruk. “UK Complicit in War Crimes through Arms Export to Saudi Arabia and UAE.” Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK, aohr.org.uk/index.php/en/all-releases/item/7204-uk-complicit-in-war-crimes-through-arms-export-to-saudi-arabia-and-uae.html.

 

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 by Jackson Hettler

Terrorism in France: Past and Present

Photo: International Business Times, 2015

Of the 28 countries that make up the European Union, France has constantly been an influential force in shaping policy and taking action against extremist threats. Be that as it may, unfortunately, France also has the highest frequency of terror attacks of any EU country. The government has struggled not only to combat such provocations but also to understand why they have become so widespread.

France has the largest Muslim population in Europe and in 2015 11.8% of its population was foreign-born, compared to 8.9% in 2014. This number has risen and fallen as the EU has struggled to create and enforce strict immigration policies. Due to such bureaucratic logjams terror organizations have been able to infiltrate the country and recruit local and foreign citizens in its jails. The contagion can be traced back to a policy that was scrapped by then Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2002.

Sarkozy eliminated the “Police de Proximité,” which was a neighborhood policing policy designed to effect friendlier police work. The absence of this program resulted in resentment of officers of the law, as well as an increase in repressive tactics and arrests. Consequently, many African and Middle Eastern youth were placed in French prisons, which proved fertile grounds for radicalization. They were angry, poor, and had criminal records – all reasons why recruiters for Islamic extremist organizations like ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) were able to radicalize them.

Since the 2002 spike in arrests, many of those who were radicalized have been released from prison and have gone on to perpetrate violence in France. How best to combat this rise in terrorism? An effort must be made to halt recruitment in French prisons. As for society as a whole, an outreach program to French youth, especially in inner cities and their schools, would prove beneficial. Such programs function like an inoculation against terror, stifling recruitment and the flow of extremist ideology.

In 2013 France went to war against two Muslim governments when it invaded Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). This exacerbated tensions and widened the divide between Muslims and the French government. ISIS has carried out its deadliest assaults since this time. On January 7th, 2015 two Islamist gunmen forced their way into the Paris headquarters of satirical weekly news-magazine Charlie Hebdo and opened fire, killing twelve. Less than a year later, on November 13th, 2015, nine EU citizen members of ISIL launched a coordinated offensive at a soccer stadium, a concert hall, restaurants, and bars. 130 were killed, and 413 were wounded. On Bastille Day in 2016, an Islamic State supporter drove a truck through a crowd, killing 86 people. Just 12 days later ISIL soldiers slit the throat of an 85-year-old priest in Normandy, killing him.

Between 1980 and 2003, a span of 23 years, terror strikes killed 87 people in France. Between 2003 and 2018, only 15 years, three times as many people (250) were killed. The question remains, how can France and other EU countries stop attacks before they occur? The answer necessarily lies in policy. An anti-terrorism law was passed in 2014 that allowed the government to prevent at-risk citizens from leaving the country. The same law banned EU citizens from entering France if they were deemed a threat to society. The “French Patriot Act” passed in 2015, created a vast surveillance program. It proved a massive step in advancing French security, and it continues to pave the way for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to curb the dispersal of terrorist ideologies. 

French President Emmanuel Macron promises to tighten French immigration policy, but what’s missing, as stated earlier, is a comprehensive strategy aimed at educating the public with the intention of inoculating it against extremist views.

France is at a crossroads. Today’s legislation is vital to the country’s future. There must be a proactive strategy for countering terrorist recruitment. Those who would be affected most by such preventative measures, youth, are responsible for France’s future. Whether they step into a future that is violent or peaceful is up to lawmakers today.

Photo: yougov.uk

Sources

Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaisse. “Understanding Urban Riots in France.” Brookings, Brookings, 28 July 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-urban-riots-in-france/

Tribalat, M. “M. Tribalat.” Population, Institut National D’études Démographiques, 23 Jan. 2018, https://www.persee.fr/doc/pop_1634-2941_2004_num_59_1_18464

“Bilan Démographique 2016À Nouveau En Baisse, La Fécondité Atteint 1,93 Enfant Par Femme En 2016 .” Bilan Démographique 2016 – Insee Première – 1630, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2554860

McPartland, Ben. “Some Truths about Immigration in France.” The Local, The Local, 13 Oct. 2015, https://www.thelocal.fr/20151013/some-truths-about-migration-to-and-from-france

RFI. “Auditors Slam Sarkozy Policing Policy.” RFI, RFI, 8 July 2011, http://en.rfi.fr/france/20110708-auditors-slam-sarkozy-policing-policy

Astier, Henri. “Paris Attacks: Prisons Provide Fertile Ground for Islamists.” BBC News, BBC, 5 Feb. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31129398

“46 Years of Terrorist Attacks in Europe, Visualized.” The Washington Post, WP Company, www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/a-history-of-terrorism-in-europe/.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/a-history-of-terrorism-in-europe/

Smith, David, and Kim Willsher. “Clashes in Central African Republic as UN Authorises French Intervention.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 5 Dec. 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/05/central-african-republic-un-vote-french

Nicolas. “Global Legal Monitor.” France: National Assembly Adopts Immigration Bill | Global Legal Monitor, 9 Sept. 2015, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-national-assembly-adopts-immigration-bill/

Loesche, Dyfed, and Felix Richter. “Infographic: Many People Expect Terrorist Attacks in 2017.” Statista Infographics, 23 Mar. 2017, https://www.statista.com/chart/8638/many-people-expect-terrorist-attacks-in-2017/

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