Remittances: Reverberations for Conflict-Ridden Regions

Since the start of the 21st century, the world economy’s reliance on remittances has risen sharply as globalization enabled growth that created favorable incentives for migration through several emerging markets. Remittances, which refer to transfer payments made by foreign workers to their families back home, have benefitted both the likes of high-growth economies, like China and India, as well as weaker states that failed to attract investment due to incessant conflict and instability. In total, remittances (as a % of Gross Domestic Product) have increased by 105% since 1999, fueling household consumption and stepping in as a guarantor of financial security for vulnerable families located in fragile and/or underdeveloped states.

Yet, with lockdowns across the globe interrupting economic activity, the flow of remittances that sustain countries rife with crime, terrorism, and violence has been disrupted. As a result, countries with a high dependency on remittances will be forced to rely on the decisions made by foreign governments, of which they have no influence over. In addition, state-sponsored efforts to monitor and impose mandatory quarantines have disproportionately targeted migrants, limiting their movements, and in many cases, using the opportunity to impose draconian immigration reform to placate political aims.

As one example, Malaysia, which hosts nearly 5 million migrant workers (documented and undocumented), has been particularly aggressive in its COVID-19 response. As a popular destination for workers from a variety of South and East Asia countries, Malaysia’s raids of areas filled with migrants has attracted scrutiny. An Al-Jazeera documentary featuring the experiences of migrants was subsequently responded to with a police investigation of the journalists, followed by accusations of sedition and defamation. One migrant in particular who chose to share his experience with the Al-Jazeera journalists was the subject of a 2-week police manhunt that culminated in his arrest and planned deportation. Similar state-sponsored efforts targeting migrant workers have been cited in other popular migrant destinations like the United States, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Lebanon, among several others.

With migrants unable to earn, the potential economic reverberations will extend far beyond the borders of states that employ, and depend upon, migrant labor. Though several variables can be used to describe remittance-dependent economies, these countries tend to fall in one (or both) of the following categories:

  1. Countries that have struggled to industrialize, leading to a weak manufacturing base. This is often due to, or followed by poor job growth and a lack of diversification beyond the agricultural sector. Examples of such countries would include Tonga, Haiti, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
  2. Countries that are ridden with incessant conflict and chronic crime & terrorism. Such conditions drive the labor supply (particularly younger workers) to work abroad, either in nearby regional hubs or on other continents. Example countries in this category include Yemen, Palestine, South Sudan, and El Salvador.

Should remittance volumes continue to recede in the developing world, the consequences could be vast. Data compiled by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), estimates that global remittances could drop by as much as $110 Billion USD, or 20% of the annual total. Sixty countries, ranging from low-income to middle-income, depend on remittances for at least 5% of their respective GDP. Furthermore, remittances are responsible for contributing tax revenue for governments, which in turn, provide funding for varied public services, many of which have become only more integral during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the absence of substantial foreign direct investment or multilateral aid, the timeline for recovery will last longest in the countries with the most acute needs. Though aid and investment remain vital sources of capital for low and middle-income countries, they are both dwarfed by the substantial inflows brought in by remittances. In the last year alone, remittances have accounted for $550 billion USD worth of funds in such countries.

Regardless of the circumstances, the consistent flow of remittances is vital for sustaining consumption and keeping businesses afloat in remittance-dependent countries. The inability to maintain remittances can result in cascading economic damage. A failure to induce job creation is one of the most oft-cited conditions that can foment, or accelerate, violence through spikes in crime and terrorism. Conflict hotspots in the Sahel region, Gulf region, East Africa, and South Asia are particularly vulnerable, given their outsized regional dependence on remittances to fulfill the most basic living standards.

To help pare the ripple effects that a drop in remittances would create, a handful of solutions could prove useful. First, governments with the capacity to enact stimulus efforts can indirectly assist migrant laborers. Stimulus programs can boost consumption, incentivizing companies that employ migrants to maintain their payrolls to meet market demand. Second, the costs associated with transferring funds across borders can amount between 7-10% in fees. State-led efforts to reduce these cross-border transfer fees ensures that more money reaches the intended recipient(s). Though efforts to establish a global compact are underway, more collaboration is required between those nations that send remittances, and those that receive them.

Ensuring that migrants are equipped with the tools needed to weather the pandemic is not just a humanitarian issue, but an economic one that sets the stage for a quicker post-pandemic transition. Businesses located in migrant-dependent economies, like those found in Southeast Asia and the Gulf region, will not be able to fulfill their workforce needs from domestic labor. Instead, these countries may find themselves competing for the very same migrants they turned away, delaying the opportunity for a global economic recovery.

A Dangerous Method:  Zurich University Study Exemplifies Double-Edged Sword of Migration Policy in Europe

Researchers at Zurich University of Applied Sciences have released data linking a rise in criminality in Germany to teenage migrants, thereby sparking a larger conversation about the conditions immigrants and asylum-seekers face.

Conducted in Lower- Saxony, Germany, a densely populated area in which 745,185 of its 8 million residents do not have German citizenship, the study called Teenagers as Perpetrators and Victims (originally Jugendliche und Flüchtlinge als Täter und Opfer) indicated that the overall percentage of crimes had increased by 10.4% by the end of 2016[1]. While that information alone is not necessarily problematic, it states that 92.1% of these criminal cases are linked to immigrants[2]. The study comprehensively breaks down several areas of criminality and links them to potential causes and contributing factors like lack of community engagement, violent social norms, parental involvement, or even radicalization[3].

Increasingly popular extreme right-wing parties have linked immigrants to crime long before this study had been released. While most people saw the connection as incidental at best, this government-funded study could add legitimacy to parties that before were dismissed as “extremist”. It is evident that the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016 has impacted Europe, and the world, deeply. Chancellor Angela Merkel is still struggling politically with her decision to leave borders open in August of 2015, and European Commission President Juncker made migration policy and proper burden-sharing a major item on the European Union’s agenda. This study has the potential to influence large policy changes, especially now that the German government is discussing changing its policies regarding family reunification and asylum applications[4].

Despite its potential political influence, the link between migrants and criminality is indicative of a much larger issue among newcomers– and especially refugees. This study offers exact facts, dates, and graphs, but also sheds light on what happens to populations that are left without proper community involvement, education, and a sense of inclusion.

The researchers Christian Pfeiffer, Dirk Baier, and Soeren Kliem found that over half of the violent crimes were committed by young immigrant males and that these populations face serious problems that are not obvious at first glance[5]. A lack of integration and engagement can lead to more than just criminality, it can also lead to radicalization. The researchers did, however, find a concrete way that the government and communities could improve conditions: Education.

Language courses, community involvement, and professional training are some of the things that could help make newcomers more integrated and help youth build stronger ties to their communities. Education is key for German natives as well– since right-wing nativist parties like the Alternative fuer Deutschland benefit largely from uniformed and frightened populations. An open flow of information could ease hostility and prevent further prejudice and conflict.

21.06.2017
Europe

This study, while having been conducted in Germany,  alludes to a much bigger picture: similar results have been found in the Netherlands, France, Austria, Italy, and other countries in Europe. It has already sparked a larger discourse, or perhaps a call to action, about the conditions and the treatment of newcomers to various European countries. Despite being a double-edged sword because of the possibility of it reinforcing anti-immigrant, anti-refugee or anti-Islam sentiments, this study is powerful because it also offers a voice to the next generation in which insufficient investment has been made.

A graphic published by the German Federal Statistical Office in 2015[6]

Sources:

[1] Pfeiffer, Christian & Baier, Dirk & Kliem, Sören. (2018). Zur Entwicklung der Gewalt in Deutschland. Schwerpunkte: Jugendliche und Flüchtlinge als Täter und Opfer.

[2] Pfeiffer, Christian & Baier, Dirk & Kliem, Sören. (2018). Zur Entwicklung der Gewalt in Deutschland. Schwerpunkte: Jugendliche und Flüchtlinge als Täter und Opfer.

[3] Germany Must Come to Terms With Refugee Crime. (2018, January 3). Bloomberg.com. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-03/germany-must-come-to-terms-with-refugee-crime

[4] German would-be coalition partners plan 1,000/month cap to family reun. (2018, January 12). Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics-refugees/german-would-be-coalition-partners-plan-1000-month-cap-to-family-reunification-idUSKBN1F10UT

[5]Pfeiffer, Christian & Baier, Dirk & Kliem, Sören. (2018). Zur Entwicklung der Gewalt in Deutschland. Schwerpunkte: Jugendliche und Flüchtlinge als Täter und Opfer.

[6] Karte: Statistiken zu Ausländern und Schutzsuchenden (Flüchtlingen) – Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis).. Retrieved January 16, 2018, from https://service.destatis.de/DE/karten/migration_integration_regionen.html